By Li Hongmei People's Daily Online

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Thailand last Tuesday to attend a regional security conference expected to focus on the North Korean nukes, Myanmar's human rights record and terrorism; then she headed to Thai's resort island of Phuket for the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Ms. Clinton 's political venture to Southeast Asia acts as a symbol of the U.S. desire to engage more deeply and effectively with ASEAN on regional and global priorities.

That also explained why after years of hesitation, on July 22, Hillary on behalf of the U.S. new administration finally set pen to paper and signed the United States' Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, completing the U.S. accession to the Treaty and along with other parties pledging to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity, and to cooperate in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was initially signed by relevant ASEAN countries in 1976, setting the formula for regional cooperation with three principles highlighted—peaceful solution to regional disputes, never resorting to forces, and never meddling in others' internal affairs. In 2003, China signed for the accession to the Treaty, due to the fact that China's influence over the region had then increasingly come in sight. On the contrary, U.S. at that time so much hesitated to sign and join the Treaty, seemingly for the consideration that it would not totally drop the intention to turn to force as a means to resolving the regional problems.

As a matter of fact, the Southeast Asia has always been incorporated by the U.S. as a crucial part in its Asia-Pacific strategic interests system. Even immediately after the WWII, the U.S. started to shift its strategic focal point to Asia, and in particular, Southeast Asia. Throughout the entire 1970s, the core strategic mission conducted by the U.S. is curbing Communism from wide spreading in the region. For this purpose, the U.S. signed a wide array of security and defense treaties with several ASEAN countries, building up its networking of military deployment in Asia-Pacific region. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty hammered out as follows was not only considered a key link in the U.S. regional defense chain, but a signal for the coming of age of the U.S. regional defense system.

Nevertheless, with the shared anti-Communism mission giving way to regional cooperation, and ASEAN playing a leading part in regional issues, the U.S. clout over Southeast Asia began to dwindle away after 1970s. And its involvement in space race with the former Soviet Union throughout the entire 1980s almost dominated the national attention and strength of the U.S., and thereby distracting it from Asia-Pacific region.

Some analysts deem that the U.S. pursuing the accession to the Treaty and reinitiating the U.S. 'strong and productive presence' in Southeast Asia at the time aimed to remain a commanding elevation in order to offset China's growing influence in the region, especially restrict the expansion of the Chinese Navy in South China Sea, and cushion the nerves of some ASEAN countries toward China's rise. To the above analyses, Mr. Clinton did not sidestepped, instead, she stated that quite a few of the Chinese neighbors had showed their anxieties over China's rise, and added that the U.S. was ready to reach out to more than ever of the Southeast countries strengthening cooperation with them.

Actually, the U.S. has all along given tacit consent and support to those who come out to challenge China's sovereignty over the South China Sea.

Nothing venture, nothing gain. Although it is still unclear whether Secretary Clinton's political venture to Southeast Asia was a rewarding trip with fruitful results as expected, one thing is certain—the journey is also more bumpy than anticipated. From Myanmar accusing her of rashly interfering in its internal affairs over the so-called human rights record to North Korea exchanging barbs with her on nukes, the muscle-flexing Secretary stoked strong emotions of the arch-foes. And on the occasion of the regional forum, Ms. Clinton displayed the US-style arrogance, while her rivals again put on the act of being wildly put out.

Seen from the prisms of both history and reality, it is evident that pointed rhetoric and even hysterical braying can hardly scare the hell of the rival forces, let alone herd them into the orbit as wished. Perhaps, the U.S. needs to learn what to do in Southeast Asia. And first and foremost, it should refrain from doing something leading to just the opposite. Otherwise, strategic privilege would possibly descend into strategic crisis.